Problems › Business Transformation Consulting › Logistics & Supply Chain
In freight the diagnosis phase is where the real trade-offs between dedicated lanes and spot work get left unresolved, because the same advisers later profit from staffing whichever option they recommend. Logistics and freight companies carry a specific bind here — dedicated freight dilutes margin and is also the only thing that fixes driver turnover. Until that is priced, revenue per loaded mile will keep moving for reasons nobody can attribute, and the debate about programme spend to date will stay a matter of opinion.
In freight the diagnosis phase is where the real trade-offs between dedicated lanes and spot work get left unresolved, because the same advisers later profit from staffing whichever option they recommend. Logistics and freight companies carry a specific bind here — dedicated freight dilutes margin and is also the only thing that fixes driver turnover. Until that is priced, revenue per loaded mile will keep moving for reasons nobody can attribute, and the debate about programme spend to date will stay a matter of opinion.
A transformation project combines three distinct tasks: mapping which lanes fail to cover their driver and fuel costs once revenue per loaded mile is calculated, selecting which dedicated contracts to retain or replace with spot freight, and supplying the planners and drivers needed to operate the adjusted network. Providers bundle these tasks because the initial mapping is sold at low margin and the return comes from executing whatever volume of change the mapping itself generates. The result is that the people doing the mapping have a commercial interest in finding problems that require large follow-on work.
Operators see programmes stall because the core question never gets answered first: which portions of the fleet actually clear an operating ratio target once deadhead miles and driver turnover are factored in, and which of those portions can be altered this quarter without losing the drivers needed to run them. When that question is skipped, the work instead becomes a set of department-named workstreams that preserve the existing mix of dedicated and spot business.
The test is whether the COO or CFO can already list the two or three moves that would lift revenue per mile or cut deadhead, with the driver-count and load-factor arithmetic attached. If those moves are known, the requirement is execution capacity. If they are not known, spending on execution first simply locks in more of the current revenue-per-mile and turnover pattern.
Corporate Strategy & Transformation (catalog id t5) produces only the mapping step: an allocation of revenue and cost to each lane and contract type that shows which units subsidise the others and the sequence of changes that follows from the numbers. It stops before placing people on site. When the mapping shows that forty additional drivers or planners are required, it states that directly, which costs less than discovering it on the first delivery invoice.
These three together are the signature. One on its own usually points somewhere else.
✓ Revenue per loaded mile and deadhead percentage are tracked in weekly reports but no one has linked either figure to a specific set of contract changes.
✓ Driver turnover data sits in HR dashboards while operations continues to accept dedicated freight that requires the same drivers to sit unpaid between loads.
✓ Workstreams are labelled by function such as 'driver recruiting' or 'lane optimisation' rather than by the specific revenue-per-mile or operating-ratio gap they are meant to close.
The move that usually makes it worse. Engaging the firm that will later bid on the delivery work to first produce the diagnosis of which freight mix and driver balance needs to change.
It is for you if you run or finance a freight company and the word "transformation" is being used before anyone has agreed what is broken. It is the situation where the numbers are available but nobody has put them in an order that produces a decision.
It is not for you if Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
Below is an excerpt from a real run of this analysis on a freight company. It is a sample profile rather than a customer, and it is unedited engine output — this is the format you get, on your own numbers.
The subject is Ridgeway Freight Systems, a sample company profile used for testing rather than a customer — $240M revenue, 900 drivers.
Excerpt from a real Percision run · Cost Reduction & Efficiency · sample company profile
The move. Leverage paid-for terminal density to raise pricing on 50 lanes and reinvest the gains into driver retention, creating a self-funding margin-expansion flywheel.
| Investment required | $0.6–0.9M over 36 months (pricing engine + retention bonuses) |
| Expected return | Base case: $4.2–6.3M incremental annual revenue at 85%+ incremental margin, yielding 7–10× ROI on the $0.9M investment within 24 months. |
| Revenue, year 1 | $289–293M |
| Revenue, year 2 | $298–306M |
| Revenue, year 3 | $310–320M |
| Exit criteria | Strategy should be reversed if, within 12 months, net revenue per hundredweight on the 50 lanes has not increased by at least 2% OR if driver turnover has not declined below 75% by Month 18, OR if one of the two $25M dedicated contracts is lost at renewal without a 1%+ rate increase. |
This is one move out of a full analysis. Read a complete report — every page, no email required.
This question routes to Corporate Strategy & Transformation, one of 29 engagements the platform runs. For logistics and freight companies it works through revenue per loaded mile, driver turnover, deadhead percentage and operating ratio, then produces the sequence rather than a list of options — which move first, what it funds, and the observation that would say the sequence is wrong.
You watch the analysis get built before paying anything. Read a complete report here if you would rather see the depth first.
For a mid-market company the diagnostic phase alone is commonly £75k–£250k over six to ten weeks, and the delivery phase that follows is usually several multiples of that. Large-firm day rates run roughly £1,500–£3,500 for a consultant and £4,000–£8,000 for a partner, and a typical team blends the two so the effective rate lands somewhere in the middle. The number that matters is not the day rate, though — it is the ratio of diagnosis to delivery, because that is where the scope is set.
No, and any tool that claims otherwise is selling you something. Software cannot run a programme office, hold a difficult conversation with a divisional MD, or supply forty people for nine months. What it can do is produce the analysis that decides whether you need those things, and what they should be pointed at — which is the part that is most often rushed and most expensive to get wrong.
Buy the diagnosis separately from whoever will deliver, and write the decision down before you take delivery bids. Once the two or three changes are named and the arithmetic is on paper, the delivery tender is a procurement exercise with a fixed brief. Once they are not, the tender sets its own brief, and it is always a larger one.
Materially, yes. Dedicated freight dilutes margin and is also the only thing that fixes driver turnover — which changes both the diagnosis and the order of the fixes. The metrics that decide it here are revenue per loaded mile, driver turnover, deadhead percentage, and an answer built on industry-general benchmarks will usually point at the wrong one first.
Less than most people expect. Your last twelve months of revenue and cost split the way you already split it, plus whatever you hold on revenue per loaded mile and driver turnover. The analysis is explicit about what it is assuming where your data stops, which is more useful than waiting for numbers you may never have.
Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
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