Problems › Corporate Strategy Consulting › Logistics & Supply Chain
Most operators who seek corporate strategy input start with a fleet or lane question, and the two call for opposite moves. What makes this harder for logistics and freight companies is structural: dedicated freight dilutes margin and is also the only thing that fixes driver turnover. Any credible answer therefore has to hold revenue per loaded mile and driver turnover in the same view, which is exactly where most internal analysis stops because the two live in different systems.
Most operators who seek corporate strategy input start with a fleet or lane question, and the two call for opposite moves. What makes this harder for logistics and freight companies is structural: dedicated freight dilutes margin and is also the only thing that fixes driver turnover. Any credible answer therefore has to hold revenue per loaded mile and driver turnover in the same view, which is exactly where most internal analysis stops because the two live in different systems.
The distinction is not academic. Corporate strategy asks where to play: which dedicated contracts and spot lanes to hold, what terminals or equipment to buy or sell, how capital moves between contract and for-hire operations, and what the corporate centre does that justifies its cost. Business-unit strategy asks how to win: revenue per mile on specific lanes, load factor, deadhead percentage, and the specific shipper taking capacity away from the spot market. Both are legitimate; they use different evidence and produce different decisions.
The reason they get confused is that the symptom is often identical. Flat consolidated revenue looks the same whether the cause is one underperforming dedicated contract or a portfolio that has drifted into a mix of dedicated and spot work with no relationship to driver availability. The test is what happens when you disaggregate: if revenue per loaded mile and driver turnover move together across contracts, you have a competitive problem in a single market and the portfolio view will not find it. If the average is being made by spot loads carrying dedicated contracts, you have a portfolio problem and no amount of lane-level pricing inside the weak contracts will fix it.
The second thing corporate strategy is for, and the one most often skipped, is the parenting question — what the centre adds. A corporate centre earns its cost either by allocating drivers and loads better than the spot market would, by supplying a backhaul network the units could not build alone, or by imposing discipline on dedicated pricing that the units would not impose on themselves. If it does none of those, it is a tax on the units, and the honest strategic answer may be to shrink it rather than to redirect it.
Corporate Strategy & Transformation (catalog id t5) runs the portfolio arithmetic — revenue per loaded mile by contract, contribution after driver turnover cost, the deadhead each unit actually carries — and produces the allocation view. Where the answer turns out to be a single-market competitive question, it will say so and point at the narrower analysis rather than dressing a pricing problem in portfolio language.
These three together are the signature. One on its own usually points somewhere else.
✓ Revenue per loaded mile is flat while driver turnover rises in one contract type but not the other
✓ Nobody can state what the corporate centre does with loads or drivers that a dedicated manager could not buy on the spot market
✓ Capital and drivers are allocated roughly in proportion to last year’s dedicated volume rather than to return after deadhead
The move that usually makes it worse. Running a portfolio review on a company that is really one network of lanes, which produces a recommendation to divest the dedicated contracts that were about to absorb the excess spot capacity.
It is for you if you run or finance a freight company and the group result is flat and the units inside it are not moving together. It is the situation where the numbers are available but nobody has put them in an order that produces a decision.
It is not for you if Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
Below is an excerpt from a real run of this analysis on a freight company. It is a sample profile rather than a customer, and it is unedited engine output — this is the format you get, on your own numbers.
The subject is Ridgeway Freight Systems, a sample company profile used for testing rather than a customer — $240M revenue, 900 drivers.
Excerpt from a real Percision run · Pricing Strategy · sample company profile
The move. Reprice 3-year dedicated renewals by 4-6% and retain 44%-turnover drivers to lift $82M book margin by $3.3M.
The leak it closes. $1.3M annual driver-replacement cost reduced by retaining 120 drivers at 44% turnover
The assumption it rests on. 12 of 14 renewing contracts accept 4-6% rate increase — the engine put the probability at 0.75.
| Investment required | $0.8-1.2M annual retention bonus pool (within $18M 3-year capacity) |
| Expected return | 275-413% annual ROI on $0.8-1.2M retention spend |
| Revenue, year 1 | $83.6M dedicated revenue (+$1.6M from 2% blended rate increase on 50% of book) |
| Revenue, year 2 | $85.3M dedicated revenue (+$3.3M from 4% rate increase on 75% of book) |
| Revenue, year 3 | $87.1M dedicated revenue (+$5.1M from 6% rate increase on 100% of book) |
| Exit criteria | Exit this move if fewer than 8 of 14 contracts renew at ≥3% premium by Month 18, OR if driver turnover rises above 55% by Month 12; reallocate retention bonus pool to LTL driver wage increases |
This is one move out of a full analysis. Read a complete report — every page, no email required.
This question routes to Corporate Strategy & Transformation, one of 29 engagements the platform runs. For logistics and freight companies it works through revenue per loaded mile, driver turnover, deadhead percentage and operating ratio, then produces the sequence rather than a list of options — which move first, what it funds, and the observation that would say the sequence is wrong.
You watch the analysis get built before paying anything. Read a complete report here if you would rather see the depth first.
Corporate strategy decides which businesses to be in and how capital moves between them. Business strategy decides how to win inside one of them. A single-market company has no corporate strategy question worth paying for — it has a competitive one. A group with three units and one balance sheet has both, and answering them in the wrong order is the common failure.
A portfolio review from a large firm is commonly £150k–£500k for eight to twelve weeks; boutiques and independents do narrower versions for £40k–£120k. The variance is driven almost entirely by how much primary data collection is in scope. If your own finance system can already produce contribution and capital by unit, most of that cost is buying analysis of numbers you already hold.
As a summary, yes; as a decision rule, no. Growth and share are two of the variables that matter and they are the easiest two to obtain, which is why the matrix persists. It becomes misleading when a unit with modest share is the one generating the cash that funds everything else, and the grid says to divest it. Use it to organise the conversation, then decide on return against capital consumed.
Materially, yes. Dedicated freight dilutes margin and is also the only thing that fixes driver turnover — which changes both the diagnosis and the order of the fixes. The metrics that decide it here are revenue per loaded mile, driver turnover, deadhead percentage, and an answer built on industry-general benchmarks will usually point at the wrong one first.
Less than most people expect. Your last twelve months of revenue and cost split the way you already split it, plus whatever you hold on revenue per loaded mile and driver turnover. The analysis is explicit about what it is assuming where your data stops, which is more useful than waiting for numbers you may never have.
Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
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