Problems › Business Transformation Consulting › HealthTech & Digital Health
In digital health most programmes that aim to protect at-risk revenue share or limit logo churn fail at the diagnosis stage because that diagnosis is commissioned from the same firm that will later price the remediation work. What makes this harder for digital health companies is structural: outcomes risk is being signed faster than the company can learn whether it can carry it — a 12-month measurement window against an 11-month sales cycle. Any credible answer therefore has to hold at-risk revenue share and engagement rate in the same view, which is exactly where most internal analysis stops because the two live in different systems.
In digital health most programmes that aim to protect at-risk revenue share or limit logo churn fail at the diagnosis stage because that diagnosis is commissioned from the same firm that will later price the remediation work. What makes this harder for digital health companies is structural: outcomes risk is being signed faster than the company can learn whether it can carry it — a 12-month measurement window against an 11-month sales cycle. Any credible answer therefore has to hold at-risk revenue share and engagement rate in the same view, which is exactly where most internal analysis stops because the two live in different systems.
A transformation engagement combines three distinct activities: determining why engagement rates and gross margins are deteriorating under signed at-risk contracts, choosing which adjustments to make first, and supplying the capacity to carry them out. Vendors bundle the three because the review phase is priced to win the subsequent delivery contract, and this structure rewards a diagnosis that expands the scope of paid work rather than narrowing it.
The pattern repeats because the company signs outcome commitments on an 11-month sales cycle while the data needed to test whether those commitments can be met arrives on a 12-month measurement cycle. The result is that questions about which enrolled members actually drive positive outcomes and which contract terms are eroding margin are turned into delivery plans before the answers exist.
The test is whether the CEO or CFO can already state the two or three factors that are moving at-risk share and logo churn in the wrong direction, with the margin impact attached. When that list exists, additional delivery capacity is a straightforward purchase; when it does not, spending on implementation first simply locks in the current contract terms at greater scale.
Corporate Strategy & Transformation produces the missing allocation view: how revenue and cost sit across the 340,000 enrolled members, which segments fund the current at-risk obligations, and the sequence of changes that would alter those numbers. It stops at the recommendation and states plainly when forty people for nine months are required, avoiding the first invoice that would otherwise confirm the larger scope.
These three together are the signature. One on its own usually points somewhere else.
✓ At-risk revenue share commitments are increasing in the forecast while engagement-rate data by cohort remains incomplete or unlinked to those commitments.
✓ A scoping document already lists workstreams by department or vendor rather than by the specific drivers of PMPM margin or logo churn.
✓ The next renewal or new contract is being priced before the current cohort’s attributed outcomes have closed the measurement window.
The move that usually makes it worse. Commissioning the diagnosis from the firm that will later bid to deliver the changes, which produces a recommended scope sized to the vendor’s delivery capacity rather than to the measured gaps in engagement rate or margin.
It is for you if you run or finance a digital health company and the word "transformation" is being used before anyone has agreed what is broken. It is the situation where the numbers are available but nobody has put them in an order that produces a decision.
It is not for you if Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
Below is an excerpt from a real run of this analysis on a digital health company. It is a sample profile rather than a customer, and it is unedited engine output — this is the format you get, on your own numbers.
The subject is Vantabridge Health, a sample company profile used for testing rather than a customer — $62M ARR, 340,000 enrolled members.
Excerpt from a real Percision run · Quick Market Scan · sample company profile
The move. Convert 180 existing employer relationships into $11.7M incremental outcomes-contingent revenue by Month 24 without new-plan procurement.
The leak it closes. $6.5M device leakage reduced by shifting kit cost to employer opt-in, improving gross margin 7 points on employer cohort
The assumption it rests on. 180 employers accept outcomes-contingent terms at 45% at-risk share — the engine put the probability at 0.7.
| Investment required | $0.6–0.9M total (2 FTE employer specialists @ $180K fully loaded each × 18 months + $120K enablement tools) |
| Expected return | 13.0× on $0.9M investment ($11.7M incremental revenue by Month 24) |
| Revenue, year 1 | $3.9M incremental employer outcomes revenue |
| Revenue, year 2 | $11.7M cumulative incremental employer outcomes revenue |
| Revenue, year 3 | $18.5M cumulative if employer cohort grows 15% YoY |
| Exit criteria | Terminate move if employer conversion rate <25% by Month 12 OR if employer at-risk share demanded exceeds 50% OR if device-kit leakage reduction <10 points by Month 18. |
This is one move out of a full analysis. Read a complete report — every page, no email required.
This question routes to Corporate Strategy & Transformation, one of 29 engagements the platform runs. For digital health companies it works through at-risk revenue share, engagement rate, gross margin and logo churn, then produces the sequence rather than a list of options — which move first, what it funds, and the observation that would say the sequence is wrong.
You watch the analysis get built before paying anything. Read a complete report here if you would rather see the depth first.
For a mid-market company the diagnostic phase alone is commonly £75k–£250k over six to ten weeks, and the delivery phase that follows is usually several multiples of that. Large-firm day rates run roughly £1,500–£3,500 for a consultant and £4,000–£8,000 for a partner, and a typical team blends the two so the effective rate lands somewhere in the middle. The number that matters is not the day rate, though — it is the ratio of diagnosis to delivery, because that is where the scope is set.
No, and any tool that claims otherwise is selling you something. Software cannot run a programme office, hold a difficult conversation with a divisional MD, or supply forty people for nine months. What it can do is produce the analysis that decides whether you need those things, and what they should be pointed at — which is the part that is most often rushed and most expensive to get wrong.
Buy the diagnosis separately from whoever will deliver, and write the decision down before you take delivery bids. Once the two or three changes are named and the arithmetic is on paper, the delivery tender is a procurement exercise with a fixed brief. Once they are not, the tender sets its own brief, and it is always a larger one.
Materially, yes. Outcomes risk is being signed faster than the company can learn whether it can carry it — a 12-month measurement window against an 11-month sales cycle — which changes both the diagnosis and the order of the fixes. The metrics that decide it here are at-risk revenue share, engagement rate, gross margin, and an answer built on industry-general benchmarks will usually point at the wrong one first.
Less than most people expect. Your last twelve months of revenue and cost split the way you already split it, plus whatever you hold on at-risk revenue share and engagement rate. The analysis is explicit about what it is assuming where your data stops, which is more useful than waiting for numbers you may never have.
Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
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