Problems › Operational Excellence Consulting › HealthTech & Digital Health
Improvement programmes reliably improve the places that were never the constraint, because those are the places that are easiest to improve. Digital health companies carry a specific bind here — outcomes risk is being signed faster than the company can learn whether it can carry it — a 12-month measurement window against an 11-month sales cycle. Until that is priced, at-risk revenue share will keep moving for reasons nobody can attribute, and the debate about throughput at the constraint will stay a matter of opinion.
Improvement programmes reliably improve the places that were never the constraint, because those are the places that are easiest to improve. Digital health companies carry a specific bind here — outcomes risk is being signed faster than the company can learn whether it can carry it — a 12-month measurement window against an 11-month sales cycle. Until that is priced, at-risk revenue share will keep moving for reasons nobody can attribute, and the debate about throughput at the constraint will stay a matter of opinion.
Every digital health operation has one thing that limits attributed outcomes at any given time — the 12-month measurement window, the capacity to validate engagement rate against at-risk share, or the team that must stand behind PMPM economics. Work done anywhere else does not increase the revenue that survives the window; it increases the volume of enrolled members whose outcomes cannot yet be confirmed. This is not controversial and has been understood for forty years, and improvement programmes still routinely violate it, for a structural reason: initiatives are generated by the teams that volunteer, and the constrained team is by definition the one with no spare capacity to volunteer while new at-risk contracts are signed.
The result is a programme with excellent hygiene and no effect. Engagement dashboards are refined, standard workflows are written, and visible boards track member activity, yet the share of revenue that converts after the measurement window stays the same. Because the activity is real, the response to flat gross margin is usually more initiatives, which consumes more of the capacity of the teams that were never limiting the conversion of at-risk share.
The second thing that hides in these programmes is that the constraint is often full of the wrong work. A book of business running at capacity on contracts whose attributed outcomes earn nothing does not have an efficiency problem; it has a selection problem wearing an efficiency costume. No amount of method fixes that, and method applied to it makes the unprofitable at-risk share cheaper to administer, which increases the volume of it.
Efficiency Transformation Strategy (catalog id T12) starts from the constraint and what occupies it — throughput of validated outcomes per unit of the scarce measurement window, contribution per unit of at-risk share, and what would have to be true for the next contract to pay after the window closes. Where the answer is that the process genuinely is the limit, a lean programme is the right purchase and the analysis will point at where to aim it.
These three together are the signature. One on its own usually points somewhere else.
✓ Engagement rate rises while logo churn and the share of at-risk revenue that survives the measurement window stay flat
✓ No single owner can state which step determines whether attributed outcomes clear the 12-month window before the next contract is signed
✓ The most improved teams are those whose work never touches the validation of outcomes that decide gross margin on the at-risk book
The move that usually makes it worse. Rolling out a method across the whole operation, which spends the scarce improvement capacity on the steps that were never limiting the conversion of at-risk share.
It is for you if you run or finance a digital health company and a large number of completed improvement initiatives and unchanged output. It is the situation where the numbers are available but nobody has put them in an order that produces a decision.
It is not for you if Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
Below is an excerpt from a real run of this analysis on a digital health company. It is a sample profile rather than a customer, and it is unedited engine output — this is the format you get, on your own numbers.
The subject is Vantabridge Health, a sample company profile used for testing rather than a customer — $62M ARR, 340,000 enrolled members.
Excerpt from a real Percision run · Customer Value Architecture · sample company profile
The move. Monetize the largest three-condition outcomes dataset to subsidize outcomes risk and generate 13% growth without increasing at-risk share.
The leak it closes. Reduces dependence on 38% at-risk PMPM revenue by adding non-at-risk, high-margin revenue stream
The assumption it rests on. State privacy laws do not mandate patient-level consent for de-identified data before 2029 — the engine put the probability at 0.7.
| Investment required | $1.8–2.4M over 18 months |
| Expected return | 2.3–3.8× on $2.1M midpoint investment within 36 months |
| Revenue, year 1 | $0.8–1.2M ARR (3–4 deals) |
| Revenue, year 2 | $2.4–3.6M ARR (9–12 deals) |
| Revenue, year 3 | $4.2–6.8M ARR (15–20 deals) |
| Exit criteria | Kill move if fewer than 2 deals ≥$150k ACV close by Month 12 OR if any state privacy statute requiring patient-level consent for de-identified data is enacted before Month 18; reallocate remaining budget to Clinical Coaching Capacity Marketplace node |
This is one move out of a full analysis. Read a complete report — every page, no email required.
This question routes to Efficiency Transformation Strategy, one of 29 engagements the platform runs. For digital health companies it works through at-risk revenue share, engagement rate, gross margin and logo churn, then produces the sequence rather than a list of options — which move first, what it funds, and the observation that would say the sequence is wrong.
You watch the analysis get built before paying anything. Read a complete report here if you would rather see the depth first.
They solve different problems and the choice matters less than the aim. Lean attacks flow and waiting; six sigma attacks variation and defects. If your problem is that things sit in queues, lean. If it is that outputs are inconsistent, six sigma. If you do not yet know which, the method choice is premature and either one will produce activity.
Assessment phases run roughly £40k–£120k. Full deployment with embedded practitioners and training is commonly £250k–£1m over a year, often quoted against a promised multiple of savings. Ask how the baseline is set and who verifies the savings, because self-verified benefits are the norm and they are systematically generous.
The method can — the material is public and cheap, and plenty of firms have taught themselves. What is genuinely hard to self-supply is the outside judgement about where to aim it and the willingness to say that a favoured department is not the problem. That is the part worth buying, and it is a much smaller purchase than a deployment.
Materially, yes. Outcomes risk is being signed faster than the company can learn whether it can carry it — a 12-month measurement window against an 11-month sales cycle — which changes both the diagnosis and the order of the fixes. The metrics that decide it here are at-risk revenue share, engagement rate, gross margin, and an answer built on industry-general benchmarks will usually point at the wrong one first.
Less than most people expect. Your last twelve months of revenue and cost split the way you already split it, plus whatever you hold on at-risk revenue share and engagement rate. The analysis is explicit about what it is assuming where your data stops, which is more useful than waiting for numbers you may never have.
Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
Describe the situation in your own words and we will tell you which analysis answers it — before you sign up for anything.
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