Problems › Should We Raise Our Prices? › Banks & Financial Services
The question is never "should we raise prices" in general. It is which customers, by how much, and what you expect to lose. This page works through it for banks and financial services firms specifically — including an unedited excerpt from a real analysis of a bank.
The question is never "should we raise prices" in general. It is which customers, by how much, and what you expect to lose. The version of this question that applies to banks and financial services firms is not the generic one. The branch network is simultaneously the deposit moat and the cost problem — and the relationship knowledge sits in six people close to retirement — so an answer that ignores efficiency ratio will be confidently wrong. The analysis has to start from cost of funds and origination per banker rather than from revenue.
Price is the fastest lever in any business — it requires no new customers, no hiring and no new product, and it arrives on the next invoice. It is also the one owners are most reluctant to touch, which is why underpricing is far more common than overpricing.
A useful price analysis does not produce one number. It produces a segmentation: which customers are paying below the value they receive, which are already at the ceiling, and where the discount distribution shows price being set by the sales conversation rather than by policy.
The uncomfortable part is that a good price change deliberately loses some customers. If a rise costs you nobody, it was too small.
These three together are the signature. One on its own usually points somewhere else.
✓ Almost every deal closes, and closes quickly
✓ Discounting is common and inconsistently applied
✓ Price has not moved in more than two years while your costs have
The move that usually makes it worse. A uniform percentage rise across the whole book, which overcharges the price-sensitive customers and still undercharges the ones who were never buying on price.
It is for you if you run or finance a bank and almost every deal closes, and closes quickly. It is the situation where the numbers are available but nobody has put them in an order that produces a decision.
It is not for you if Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
Below is an excerpt from a real run of this analysis on a bank. It is a sample profile rather than a customer, and it is unedited engine output — this is the format you get, on your own numbers.
The subject is Harborline Financial Group, a sample company profile used for testing rather than a customer — $3.1B commercial lending book, $410M of deposits.
Excerpt from a real Percision run · Customer Value Architecture · sample company profile
The move. Turn the 71% overlap into a sticky, data-driven treasury platform that raises switching costs and extends the relationship moat.
The leak it closes. Reduces operating-account attrition risk by raising switching costs; offsets 34%→22% non-interest-bearing share decline
The assumption it rests on. 50 pilot customers will adopt SaaS at $180–$420/month within 90 days of launch — the engine put the probability at 0.75.
| Investment required | $2.4–3.0M development (6 FTE × 24 months) + $0.8–1.2M 2027 core-migration integration = $3.2–4.2M total |
| Expected return | Risk/Reward 7.4×; NPV $3.1–4.2M on $3.2–4.2M investment within 5 years |
| Revenue, year 1 | $180K MRR (50 pilot customers) |
| Revenue, year 2 | $720K MRR (200 customers) |
| Revenue, year 3 | $1.8M MRR (500 customers) |
| Exit criteria | Kill the move if pilot converts <25 customers or MRR <$60K by Month 9; reallocate remaining budget to SBA 7(a)/504 desk or insurance referral partnership |
This is one move out of a full analysis. Read a complete report — every page, no email required.
This question routes to Pricing & Revenue Optimization, one of 29 engagements the platform runs. For banks and financial services firms it works through efficiency ratio, cost of funds, origination per banker and deposit concentration, then produces the sequence rather than a list of options — which move first, what it funds, and the observation that would say the sequence is wrong.
You watch the analysis get built before paying anything. Read a complete report here if you would rather see the depth first.
There is no general answer, and the useful analysis is per segment. What can be said is that the loss you fear is usually concentrated in a group whose economics you would improve by losing them.
New first is safer and slower; existing is where the money is. A defensible sequence is to move new-customer pricing, watch win rate for a quarter, then bring existing customers up at renewal with notice.
Then you are selling against them on something other than price, or you are not — and that is the real question. Competing on price without the cost structure to support it is the most reliable way to lose money at increasing volume.
Materially, yes. The branch network is simultaneously the deposit moat and the cost problem — and the relationship knowledge sits in six people close to retirement — which changes both the diagnosis and the order of the fixes. The metrics that decide it here are efficiency ratio, cost of funds, origination per banker, and an answer built on industry-general benchmarks will usually point at the wrong one first.
Less than most people expect. Your last twelve months of revenue and cost split the way you already split it, plus whatever you hold on efficiency ratio and cost of funds. The analysis is explicit about what it is assuming where your data stops, which is more useful than waiting for numbers you may never have.
Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.
Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.
Describe the situation in your own words and we will tell you which analysis answers it — before you sign up for anything.
Describe my situation →Prefer to skip ahead? Go straight to the free diagnostic.