ProblemsShould We Raise Our Prices? › Insurance Brokers

Should We Raise Our Prices?
in Insurance Brokers

The question is never whether to raise commissions or fees in general. It is which renewal accounts, by how much, and what you expect renewal retention to lose from 91.2. For insurance brokers, this shows up in a particular place. The numbers that carry the answer are 19.0 and 91.2, and the complication specific to this industry is that 71 percent of revenue flows through carrier commissions while shifting an incremental 8 percent to fees would require replacing 142 renewal accounts and cut near-term margin by 1.8 to 2.3 points. The general version of this problem and the one you are actually in have different first moves.

The short answer

The question is never whether to raise commissions or fees in general. It is which renewal accounts, by how much, and what you expect renewal retention to lose from 91.2. For insurance brokers, this shows up in a particular place. The numbers that carry the answer are 19.0 and 91.2, and the complication specific to this industry is that 71 percent of revenue flows through carrier commissions while shifting an incremental 8 percent to fees would require replacing 142 renewal accounts and cut near-term margin by 1.8 to 2.3 points. The general version of this problem and the one you are actually in have different first moves.

Adjusting standard commissions or moving incremental revenue to fees is the fastest lever in any brokerage — it requires no new carriers, no hiring and no new risk-control services, and it arrives on the next renewal invoice. It is also the one CFOs are most reluctant to touch, which is why the 71 percent carrier commission flow persists even when an 8 percent shift to fees would require replacing 142 renewal accounts and cut near-term margin by 1.8 to 2.3 points.

A useful commission analysis does not produce one number. It produces a segmentation: which accounts are paying below the value they receive through captive feasibility, which are already at the ceiling on contingent commissions, and where the 664 shows pricing being set by the individual renewal conversation rather than by policy.

The uncomfortable part is that a good commission change deliberately loses some renewal accounts. If a rise costs you nobody, it was too small, and the 19.0 and 31 metrics only stay stable when the lost accounts are the ones already below the value line.

How to tell this is actually your problem

These three together are the signature. One on its own usually points somewhere else.

✓ Almost every renewal closes, and closes quickly with no discussion of standard commissions or fees
✓ Contingent commissions vary by producer and show no consistent tie to risk-control work
✓ Standard commissions have not moved while the 47.8 million dollars in total revenue from commissions and fees shows carrier pressure continuing

The move that usually makes it worse. A uniform percentage rise across the whole book, which overcharges the price-sensitive renewal accounts and still undercharges the ones who were never buying on commission levels.

Who this is for — and who it is not

It is for you if you run or finance an insurance broker and almost every deal closes, and closes quickly. It is the situation where the numbers are available but nobody has put them in an order that produces a decision.

It is not for you if Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.

Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.

What this looks like when the analysis is actually run

Below is an excerpt from a real run of this analysis on an insurance broker. It is a sample profile rather than a customer, and it is unedited engine output — this is the format you get, on your own numbers.

The subject is Kesterline Risk Partners, a sample company profile used for testing rather than a customer — 47.8 million dollars in total revenue from commissions and fees.

Excerpt from a real Percision run · Pricing Strategy · sample company profile

The move. Convert 460 commission accounts to fee retainers, funding a $3-5M digital workbench from productivity gains while staying inside the $4.8m investment ceiling.

What the run committed to
Investment required$3.0-5.0M total (base $3.0M, upside $5.0M for accelerated digital workbench)
Expected return3.2-4.8× over 36 months on $3-5M investment, based on +$4.2-8.5M incremental fee revenue at 35-45% gross margin versus current 19% operating margin.
Revenue, year 1$50.1-51.8M total revenue (+$2.3-4.0M incremental fee)
Revenue, year 2$54.4-57.9M total revenue (+$6.6-10.1M incremental fee)
Revenue, year 3$58.2-64.8M total revenue (+$10.4-17.0M incremental fee)
Exit criteriaStrategy should be reversed if, within 12 months, pilot conversion rate falls below 15% OR incremental churn exceeds 5% OR producer productivity drops below $600k average; OR if, within 24 months, cumulative fee revenue does not reach $6.6M incremental run-rate.

This is one move out of a full analysis. Read a complete report — every page, no email required.

What the engine does with this question

This question routes to Pricing & Revenue Optimization, one of 29 engagements the platform runs. For insurance brokers it works through 19.0, 91.2, 664 and 31, then produces the sequence rather than a list of options — which move first, what it funds, and the observation that would say the sequence is wrong.

You watch the analysis get built before paying anything. Read a complete report here if you would rather see the depth first.

Questions people ask about this

How much can I raise prices without losing customers?

There is no general answer, and the useful analysis is per segment. What can be said is that the loss you fear is usually concentrated in a group whose economics you would improve by losing them.

Should I raise prices for existing customers or only new ones?

New first is safer and slower; existing is where the money is. A defensible sequence is to move new-customer pricing, watch win rate for a quarter, then bring existing customers up at renewal with notice.

What if my competitors are cheaper?

Then you are selling against them on something other than price, or you are not — and that is the real question. Competing on price without the cost structure to support it is the most reliable way to lose money at increasing volume.

Is this different in insurance brokers than in other industries?

Materially, yes. 71 percent of revenue flows through carrier commissions while shifting an incremental 8 percent to fees would require replacing 142 renewal accounts and cut near-term margin by 1.8 to 2.3 points — which changes both the diagnosis and the order of the fixes. The metrics that decide it here are 19.0, 91.2, 664, and an answer built on industry-general benchmarks will usually point at the wrong one first.

What data do I need before this analysis is worth running for an insurance broker?

Less than most people expect. Your last twelve months of revenue and cost split the way you already split it, plus whatever you hold on 19.0 and 91.2. The analysis is explicit about what it is assuming where your data stops, which is more useful than waiting for numbers you may never have.

When is Percision the wrong tool?

Percision is the wrong tool if you already know the answer and only need execution capacity, or if the business is pre-revenue — then the constraint is evidence about the market, not analysis of your own figures. Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library. Also wrong if you need facilitation, politics, or someone to sit with a lender or buyer. Those are human jobs.

Does Percision replace a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, or AI implementation team?

Percision is not a lawyer, tax advisor, auditor, licensed appraiser, clinical or regulatory filer, or an AI implementation shop. It does not do HR casework, creative-only brand work, or impersonate a named consulting firm. It is a strategy analysis engine — not a template library.

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